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Philosophy and the Liberal Arts
by
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J.

BUCKLEY,

S.J.

The focus of these remarks is a simple, general question: How
should philosophy be taught to college students? Notice that the
possibility is simply taken for granted. We do not ask if we can teach
but how we can teach. Is this to treat philosophy like any other field
within the humanities or sciences? We give instruction in mathematics,
physics, history, English literature; can we not also teach philosophy?
An etymological rephrasing would suggest this assumption is open to
serious reservations. How can college students be taught "to love
wisdom?" Can so radical a personality-commitment be taught, be
the product of three unit courses? Is there any other subject-matter
within the contemporary liberal curriculum which speaks of love as
its finality with wisdom as its object? At least three serious difficulties
confront this presupposition of our initial question. They should be
raised and may serve, perhaps, as coordinates within which we may
chart a response, if not an answer, to the inquiry we have set ourselves.
The question belongs to an educational institution, not only because it touches some form of instruction-however ambiguous this
activity-but because "wisdom" is historically associated with the
whole purpose of education: with the Academy, the Lyceum, the
Stoa, the Garden, the University, and the College. Yet any professor
who attempts this profession must recognize paradoxically that he is
a man uniquely censored within its history. From the Platonic condemnation of the sophists who exacted tuition and claimed to teach
wisdom through the medieval meaning of philosophus and Schopenhauer's acid question: "How can philosophy degraded to become a
means of earning one's bread generally fail to degenerate into sop-
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histry?"l And now even to the most influential thinkers of our period
Heidegger has claimed: "The misinterpretations with which philosophy is perpetually beset are promoted most of all by people of our
kind, that is, by professors of philosophy."2 Wittgenstein attempted
to dissuade his pupil Norman Malcolm, currently at Cornell University, from a career as a philosophy professor, because he judged that
a normal human being could not be a university instructor and an
honest and serious thinker. The teacher had to pretend to an omnipotence he did not possess, one which could not afford to stay with
questions for years because of the demands of the weekly lectures and
the quarter-syllabus. The teacher was expected both by students and
administration to rhetorize serious, painstaking philosophic inquiry to
dazzle students and gain the reputation and tenure of an "interesting
teacher." To Malcolm, Wittgenstein wrote: "The temptation for you
to cheat yourself will be overwhelming (though I don't mean for you
more than anyone else in your position). Only b'Y a miracle will you
be able to do decent work in teaching philosophy. Please remember
these words if you forget everything I've ever said to you."3 The
antinomy here is between the possession of wisdom and its profession,
and the history of philosophy indicates the depth of the estrangement.
The difficulty of our assumption lies not only in an antithetical
relationship between teaching and wisdom but also within the sources
and nature of wisdom. "Wisdom" runs like a theme through Western
thought and educational institutions, but in various locations its
meanings differ profoundly. It can denote "knowing all things, though
not in detail" or the reflexiYe realization that one knows nothing
while others think they do. "Wisdom" has embraced either conclusions reached or the methods by which they are reached or the
principles from which these methods proceed and by which these
conclusions are justified. "Wisdom" can be either a habit of thought
or a manner of choice or a conditioned sensitivity to values or a life
which issues from reflection, decision, and perception. It can be a
particular human achievement or a comprehensive divine gift which
subsumed them all. Whatever its definition and location, however,
"wisdom" always touches upon something ultimate, something absolute
enough to have other things related to it or evaluated by it. Whatever its pluralisms, I suggest that in Anglo-Saxon countries serious
students have turned from philosophy courses elsewhere in the aca-

1 Arthur Schopenhauer, "Preface to the Second Edition," 'The World as
Will and Representation. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. (New York: Dover, 1958)
Vol. i, p. xx.
2 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Ralph Manheim. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961) p. 9.
3 Norman Malcom, Ludwig Wittgenstein , A Memoir. (London: Oxford,
1958) pp. 36-37.
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demic search for ultimates or absolutes. As in Socrates' time, wisdom
is derivative for most students: The conclusions of poets, dramatists,
scientists, and artists-even of enthusiasts and seers-are taken for
wisdom, though they be unable to ground or explain their own propositions. Logistic methods of mathematics in their exactitude or operational methods of science in their productivity are taken for wisdom,
and used paradigmatically to judge the seriousness of other methods
and other forms of discourse. Transcendent principles of religion or
of revolution or human principles of sensitive interrelations are taken
for wisdom, as if what is most profound may be beyond reason but
not beyond emotion, action, or experience. But wisdom as a unique,
a philosophic enterprise--one with its own principles, methodologies
and resolutions-is neither very much the subject of courses in "philosophy" nor the object of policy or programmed instruction, indicating
anything like "love." This curricular stance of the American university also forms part of our problem: How can the college student be
taught to love wisdom?
The ambiguous position of the professor and the derivative nature
of wisdom compound the difficulties with the third term of our
question: the college students. Here, I am speaking of the undergraduate student, especially of liberal arts students, but by no means
exclusively so. Philosophers have habitually considered youth too callow
or too enthusiastic to care about much besides pleasures, wars, ambitions and loves. Contemporary educationalists have judged him
either too inexperienced or too financially oriented to entertain an
education which was neither specialized in its departments nor geared
to a career. And so the undergraduate college has lost its unique
fin ality. Professional schools and graduate departments have reached
down into the college to train students even earlier for the specialists
they are to become or for the careers they are to enter. So much of
the liberal arts have become pedantic or technical training in a
speciality, while the genuinely liberal tradition-whose aim was, under
one or another variant, to free a student-is little understood in its
theory or operative in significant practice. Most undergraduate colleges
are content to train the student technically, because this is what he
wants or what he needs or where he is or where he is going.
The assumption of the possibility of philosophic instruction,
then, conceals a threefold diremption: between the professorial career
and wisdom, between curricular commitments and wisdom, between
collegiate orientations and wisdom. The split involves in a complicated
antinomy: the teacher, philosophy, the student, and wisdom.
The history of philosophic instruction within American higher
education has done little to obviate or to heal these lesions. This
instruction has passed over an enormously varied course as the
orientation of its teaching reflects the manifold influences and in-
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volvements predominant in each period. Perhaps three moments can
be isolated which reflect three distinct structures within American
higher education and which embody three divergent approaches to
philosophic initiations: the religious colleges of the 17th and 18th
centuries, the rising Germanified universities of the 19th and early
20th centuries, and the technologized multiversities of our own times.
And corresponding to these patterns of education stand three different
understandings of philosophy: forensic, historical, and technological.
Philosophy as taught in the early religious colleges conceived its
subject-matter as the content of statements, a heritage of wisdom, an
array of conclusions; "theses" they were called in the older Latin
textbooks, in the English manuals and in the Harvard Broadsides.
These buttressed the conclusions of a Renaissance version of Christian
theology or of the rising political doctrines of the body politic. The
function of instruction was the assimilation and defense of their truth.
Philosophy was conceived, all unknowingly within the classically
rhetorical tradition. A truth is laid down for defense, places ("topics"
in rhetoric) are searched for its proof, debate is indicative of its
mastery and persuasion is the finality of its engagement. When this
enterprise was well conducted, it contained rigor in its definition of
terms, clarity in its demonstrations, and exactitude in its argumentation.
The debater was to repeat the counterargument of his opponent in
the precisely ordered relationship of the terms, distinguish the term
or the proposition which was critical, and indicate how this change
bore upon the conclusion. It could be precise and elegant. As it
appeared to its critics, however, it was over-simple in its propositions,
unnuanced in its elaborations, and unconvincing in its "proofs." When
it began to disintegrate, its ignorance of history, its failure to consider the central works of genius of its tradition, and its isolation
from the current discussion among original philosophers left it seriously unfair in its consideration of adversaries, significantly uninteresting
in its presentation of a problematic, and often without the stimulus,
honesty, and challenge of even responsible debate. I can speak with
some experience of this kind of philosophic instruction, because under
the influence of the pontifical universities and Roman seminaries it
lasted in the education of the Jesuit almost a century after it had
passed from American higher education.
The second method of instruction was adopted from Germany to
remedy the obvious decadence of the first. While philosophy had been
rhetoric, now its guide was history. This second conceived wisdom
was that which philosophers taught, and the study of philosophy
became the study of philosophers: "Histories of philosophy" replaced
the systematic textbooks. These histories of philosophy were not the
medieval commentaries upon a single philosophic inquiry, a careful
following of a philosopher in his questioning deeper and deeper into
21

his resolution. They were a more or less readable compilation of his
conclusions contextualized by antecedent philosophers, systematized
into an assimilable unity, and evaluated in importance by the impact
these conclusions or methods were to attain with successors. Philosophic
instruction-no matter how much this accusation was denied-became
history; and history, a development incorporating the 19th Century's
enthusiasm for progress, in which each successive continental philosopher found the past the preparation for his own definitive achievement. Philosophy as history was given its unity not by subject matter
and argument but by chronology or by influence or by system. When
the enterprise was well done, it contained care in its textual analysis
and assignations, concern about systematically ambiguous terms and
propositions, and vision in its elaboration of historical patterns. It
could be engrossing and stimulating. As it appeared to its subsequent
critics, however, it was superficial when it attempted to cover vast
periods of philosophy, unphilosophic in its failure to deal carefully
with argument and principle, and deadening both in its location of
questions only within the past and in its pedantic muster of detail.
While the first, in its manual elaborations failed to come to grips with
original philosophers, the second failed to grasp or to occasion rigorous
argument and proof. One presented the student with a series of
conclusions to be defended. The other was a series of facts and
philosophers to be interrelated. Both lent themselves to collegiate
introductory courses in which the major problems or figures within
the philosophy were resolved in a summary fashion. Both lent themselves to too much, too quickly. Both of them initiated the study of
philosophy as the study of propositions already enunciated, either
historically or defensively conceived.
Both left their impact on 20th Century Anglo-American philosophic
inquiry, feeding into it either an enormously varied series of propositions whose discussion was philosophy or an overwhelming heterogeneity of historical opinions whose progression was philosophy. The
dominant philosophy became linguistic and highly technical, attempting
precision in meaning through semantics and accuracy in implication
through logical syntax. Carnap asserted in 1934: " Philosophy is to
be replaced by the logic of science-that is to say by the logical
analysis of the concepts and sentences of science, for the logic of
science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of
science."4 Within the decade, he would move from syntactical to
semantic emphasis, but the matrix of philosophy was consistently
linguistic. So also the unities attempted were no longer those of
4 " Philosophie wird durch Wissenschaftslogick, d.h. logische Analyse der
Begrifje und Siitze der Wissenschaf.t ersetzt ." Rudolf Carnap, Logische Syntax
der Sprache. (Wien: Julius Springer, 1934) p. iii.
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divergent subject matter as aspects of the real, nor those of methodologies and systems worked out of concepts, but those of a language
common to all the sciences. Dubious of metaphysical speculations or
of epistemological criticisms, philosophy could resolve the propositions
of the past into nonsense or unintelligibilities. The history of philosophy
became a tissue of errors. As Professor Vere Chappell defined it: "It
follows tha t the way to achieve success in philosophy-and this again
means understanding a nd the solving of problems- is to determine
how our language is in fact used and thence show where and how
philosophers h ave gone astray. "5 In its finest usages, linguistic philosophy has encouraged a careful honesty in terms and proposition,
precision in methodology, a nd a modesty in assertions. In the eyes of
its critics, however, it has become trivial in its interests and controversies, a rrogantly over-simple in its dismissal of vagueness and
ambiguity, ignorant in its unnuanced reading of the philosophic
tradition, and outdistanced in logic and semantics by the coordinate
disciplines of m a thematics and linguistics. Within this tradition, the
student is introduced to philosophic issues through perspectival discriminations of divergent philosophers and introduced to philosophic
method through logical discipline.
I suggest that either enterprise is not adequate as an introduction
into the philosophic task, most simply because the etymology of the
question fails to tell in its solution how to bring the student to love
wisdom-not to defend it, not to possess it even, but to love it. What
philosophic instruction aims at is this attitude of reverence, dedication,
based upon the deepest affection. L et me stress what I am saying:
It is this love that is the terminus of our work. Our question is how
to awaken such a love. I suggest that neither debate conclusions nor
historical and textual facts nor linguistic techniques are happy solutions to our problem. Love is awakened neither by power nor by assignment. It is awakened by a revelation of the good-by the "standing
before" of wha t has been hidden; and this revelation is of worth, of
value, of what is humanly the object of desire and joy. If philosophy
is to be "taught," it must also be through some sort of vision, a revelation tha t the enterprise of wisdom entails the object of men's deepest
love : that wha tever a m an loves most radically, whatever he moves
toward at the deepest pa rt of his person- the reflexive grasp of these
is the reality of wisdom. Wisdom-either as thought, choice or life
itself- touches upon these ultima tes which a man loves and by which
his life is structured. One is ta ught to love wisdom through the revelation of this relationship. Merleau-Ponty has put this very simply: "To
philosophize is to seek, a nd this is to imply that there are things to
5 V . C . Chappell (ed.), Ordinary Language.
Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 2.
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(Englewood Cliffs, New

see and to say."6 One can value this search only through some glimpse
of its objects. The invitation to philosophize is an invitation to
"radical reflection" (again Merleau-Ponty's expression), and one
accepts the invitation only if he discovers a love for the radicalities,
the roots of that within which he moves and loves. The introduction to philosophy, instruction in philosophy, should be a revelation of the depth and the expansion in which a man lives.
Philosophic instruction as revelation would move quite differently
from that of philosophy as rhetoric, as history, or as technique. It
would begin with the man where he is-with what Aristotle calls the
procheira, those things that are before his hand, the proximate and
the immediate. 7 And these are certainly not the possibility of movement or Thales on water or propositional calculus. The task of instruction would be to question these, to probe them, to ask what
is involved in them or why they are of worth. Socrates would begin
with generals and ask about their understanding of courage, an ultimate
which was involved in their lives; or he would ask a good man about
justice, or even a teacher about wisdom and instruction. The data
with which one begins depends very much upon where a particular
man is. The initiation of the philosophic enterprise is the questionthe question which one asks about ultimates involved in his stance. And
the method is to move-in a thousand different possible ways- from
the data which is proximate and which has meaning and worth to
those ultimates in terms of which it is understood and loved.
Now any educational institution confronts enormous problems
with such an understanding of philosophic instruction. Each student
is different. Each lives in a personal set of coordinates, a unique
history, peculiar aspirations, idiosyncratic attitudes and choices. How
can such diversity provide any commonality for philosophic questions?
Does this not make rhetorical defense or historical studies a necessary,
albeit a less ideal, program?
I think not, at least not totally-though there is much to recommend this objection as solid and serious. The personal choices of
the students have already involved them within communities of learning within the college. The students have opted for those studies which
placed them within the major division of undergraduate education.
They are involved in humanistic studies, social sciences, or physical
and biological sciences. One can begin here: with the studies seriously
entertained and the knowledge deeply loved in any of these studies
and move to the philosophical by question and inquiry. Secondly,

6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy. Trans. with a preface
by John Wild and James M. Edie. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1963) p. 41.
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics. i.2. 982b14.

24

my fu rther contention would be that as one moves through one of
these divisions in questioning towa rds its ultimates, he will find himself involved in certain constants which run through the considerations
in all of the other divisions. The ultimates which underlie or structure
any particular human enterprise in knowledge or love will be found
to pervade every human enterprise in knowledge and love. Let me
give a n example of what I mean.
If the student were studying physics, one might well begin with
either quantum mechanics or rela tivity theories. Let us say with
quantum mechanics. The class might well read Niels Bohr's great
essay which recounts his discussions with Einstein over thirty years.
The essay is interesting because it immediately introduces the question
of ultimates in physical theory. Both Einstein and Bohr agree upon
the findings of the sub-atomic physics of their period, but they are
in radical disagreement about its implication. As Bohr stated the
question of discussion: " Whether the renunciation of a causal mode
of description of atomic processes involved in the endeavor to cope
with the situation should be regarded as a temporary departure from
id ea ls to be ultima tely revived or whether we are faced with an irrevocable step towa rds obtaining the proper harmony between analysis
and syn thesis of physical phenomena."8 The problem of cause comes
out of physical research itself, but it reaches into social and humanistic
studies. You will recall tha t Thucydides poses the entire a nalysis of
the Peloponnesia n War upon the distinction between the alleged reasons
for the conflict between Athens and Sparta a nd the actua l underlying
cause: the growth of power within the one a nd the inevitable fear that
this occasioned in the other. The grasp of the power-factor within
political movements will a llow those who follow his inquiry to predict
future events when such power blocs amass again .9 In Presen t at the
Creation, one can find a simila r de termin a tion of political and economic
movements seen as an analysis of the America n origin of World \tVa r I
in the growing power of Germany and the fea r and distrust this awa kened in th e United States .10 To understand power is to understand

8 Niels Bohr, " Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in
Atomic Physics," in Albert E instein, Philosop h er-S cientist . Edited by P aul
Ar thur Schilpp. ( New York : H a rper and Row, 1949 ) Vol. i, p. 202. For th e
philosophic implications of this disc uss ion, cf. Richa rd M cK eon, " Philosophy
as a Hum a nism," in Ph iloso phy T oday. ix, No. 3/4 (Fall, 1965 ) pp. 16 3-164.
9 Thucydides, Histo ry of th e Pelopo nnesian War. i. 22-24, 88-90, 118;
ii. 9, 65; iii . 86.
10 " In th e hundred years from W a terloo to Mons, so gradually did th e
power of Germany grow-that combination of popul ation , resources, technology, a nd will- th a t, like the growth of a child. those close to it were hardly
aware of its extent . . . . A century la ter it was thought-erroneously, as it
proved-that th e combined power of Eu rope could stop the German bid . By
1917 it was clea r tha t this could not be done; the United Sta tes intervened
to p revent German domin ation of Europe." Dean Acheson, Present at the
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historical causes. And to grasp causes is, in some way, to predict and
to control the political future. Again, the purpose of the Biographia
Literaria is to locate the principle of greatness in poetic construction,
the works of talent being located in the fancy of the artist while those
of genius, within the great esemplastic imagination, which fuses the
diversities of words, image, movement into a wholeness and unity.I I
Frank Lloyd Wright defines the understanding of that to which he
has given his entire life, organic architecture, in terms of a diversity
of causes. Indeed, his description reads almost like a Schoolman: A
building should be a living organism, proceeding by way of natural
inspiration, from the nature of the materials, the nature of its purpose
in order to gratify the nature of man.12 Within theology, commitments on causality occur and occur critically. Bultmann, for example,
accepts as the principle for the differentiation of myth from hi tory,
a doctrine on causality: The course of nature and history cannot be
interrupted by the intervention of supernatural powers: cause and
effect are phenomenal and form an unbreakable nexus. Anything
which would represent the transcendent as if it were within history,
as if it were a cause of the normal, ordinary order of events is myth.
" D er Mythos objeckiviert das Jenseitige zum Dieseitigen."13
Notice that we have begun with sub-atomic physics, have localized
a term of critical importance to its understanding, and have run this
term through issues of history, political science, literary criticism,
architecture, and biblical exegesis. The issue is what is causality and
how does it function. To start with the procheira, with anything a t
hand, and to question it in depth is to move finally to the philosophic
commitments and presuppositions which underpin and justify the
obvious. While the issue can come out of any human enterprise,
it is bound to none. Conversely, while proper to none of these individually, it unites them all in common assumptions and language.
What would be further noted is that the doctrine implicit in one
field will have a telling, even if unexamined, influence in another.
Atomic doctrines of causality can jump over into pointellisma painting. Evolutionary conceptions of biology causa lity can move into
dogmatic development, historical progress, and educational or moral
Creation. (New York: Norton, 1969) p. 4. "The decision to intervene did
P.Ot flow from a general principle of foreign policy, but as a specific distru st
and fear of German intentions and ruthlessness. German miscalculation an d
stupidity fanned the fear." I bid., ftnt . to page 4, p. 740.
11 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Litteraria. Chs . 10-13. As contained in Selected Poe.try and Prose of Coleridge (New York: Modern Library,
1951) pp. 191-263.
12 Frank Lloyd Wright, "The Architect," in The Works of the Mind.
Edited hy Robert B. Heywood. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1966) p. 51.
13 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Myth ology. ( New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958) pp. 14-19.
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instruction. The great ultimates, those terms and assumptions which
underlie any field of knowledge, are the province of philosophic inquiry.
Any science or art subsumes them, implies them, contains them.
Philosophic question isolates them, examines them, and relates them
within the most basic human relationship: that of man to reality.
The alternative to such an examination, to philosophic inquiry, is
not that men will have no philosophy, but that it will be cultu rally
conditioned and immaturely accepted. Philip Frank, the great H arvard
physicist, has put the matter very well, a la Whitehead:
Quite a few great thinkers who belonged to very divergent schools of thought have been unanimous on one
point: If a scientist believes that he has no philosophy
and keeps tightly to his special field, he will really become an adherent to some "chance philosophy" as A. N.
Whitehead puts it. This great contemporary metaphysician with a solid scientific background assures us that
for a scientist deliberately to neglect philosophy is "to
assume the correctness of the chance philosophic prejudices imbibed from a nurse or a schoolmaster or
current modes of expression ."14
Philosophic instruction belongs to the undergraduate, to the liberal
studies of the college, then, ( 1) not only because it unifies them
organically in a consideration of their common assumptions (however
divergent their use and applications ) , (2) but also because it frees the
student from the prejudices of his own context by a reflexive grasp
of their structure and an expanded understanding of alternative
possibilities. Thus it is that every philosophic tradition moves back
to a grasp of principles, whether through a metaphysics of first
causes or a critique of the initial possibilities of knowledge or a
foundation study of science and mathematics to determine radical
meanings and referents.
Programmatically, philosophic inquiry should not begin with conclusions of a particular cultu re to be defended nor with the conclusions
of many philosophers to be assimilated nor perspectives to be choc:en
or refuted. It should take its data from the students, from fields other
than those classically called philosophic. It should lay against these
data questions which will take the student into their underlying presuppositions or into those ideals which give the here and now its justification and its worth. The processes by which one moves through
the initial data to the ultimates it contains (and which contain it )
are many, and their steps are many: One can begin with the apprecia14 Philip Frank, Modern Science and I ts Philosophy. (Cambridge: H arvard
University Press, 1950) p. 265.
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tion of a film, to a consideration of critical principles which structured
this a ppreciation, to a consideration of principles of art and beauty
which in turn structured both the criticism and the appreciation. In
other words, one can move from " why do I like it or why did I not
like it," to "why is it good or bad" to "what kind of thing is it and
what kind of integrity should it have." This is to move by question
from appreciation through criticism to aesthetics and metaphysics.
And notice, one is not introducing new da ta. He is working, questioning what is already present and assumed . The philosophic goes
beyond appreciation and criticism precisely by entering into it, by
inquiry into meanings and methods which either of these take for
granted. Indeed philosophic inquiry begins when one questions what
is taken for granted-not to deny it (this would be as dogma tic as
its gratuitous assumption) but to call it before radical reflection.
Granted that this is valid philosophic procedure, is it a possible
educational arrangement? Again, I think so, but only within a
liberal arts college in which ( 1) the faculty took their mutual collaboration seriously enough to be willing to discuss with and to learn
from one a nother, a nd (2) the administration encouraged the cohesion
of th e college as an academic unity, a unity whose formal structure
was intellectual and among whose liberating skills were the abilities
to move from field to field with an understa nding and a recognition
of basic assumptions, if not a technical grasp of elaborations a nd
applications. In such a college, the initial "courses in philosophy"
would not be either doctrinal nor historica l nor perspectival; they
would not be set alongside the other courses in English literature
or second year calculus. They would be transition courses, courses in
which the major works in a particular field were read for their common
assumptions- be those assumptions of principles, methods, concepts
or reality-stances.
Each major division of the college could offer such courses: The
physical scientist could begin with the works of Galileo, Newton,
Maxwell, Einstein and H eisenberg. Basic terms would operate
through the discussion of each of these works, but their meaning and
their applications would vary : motion , space/place, necessity, probability and chance, time, force, cause, etc. Methods would vary as
one shifted from the mathematic models of Gali leo, brought to bear
upon physical phenomena to yield fruitful results, to the strictly
logistic composition of forces in Newtonian mechanics as one eventually constructed the Systema Mundi from the initial coroll aries of
the parallelogram of forces. This serious, careful reading would give
the students neither a single doctrine on "causality" and motion , nor
an entire history of the question nor perspectives to be refuted. It
would open up the term itself for inquiry and the projects of great
men would suggest some of the radical variations possible in its
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pluralistic resolution. The social sciences could offer similar courses
in the concepts and methods common to critical work in their own
field: institution, freedom, man, power, and law-for a selective
example. Art and literature could open their inquiry with works
of appreciation and criticism which presuppose such concepts as
imitation, creativity, beauty, art-obj ect, etc. And notice that the
divisional separations ultimately yield before this kind of examination
as the terms and presuppositions are seen to be common to the
humanities, the social, biological, and physical sciences. Time, for
example, and its relationship to place is as critical a question in the
structure of the Magic Mountain and in the theology of Augustine
as it is in the physics of Einstein. The infinite figures in the universe
of Newton, in the mathematics of Galileo, but also in the Opus
Oxioniense of Duns Scotus and in the critical theories of Ruskin.
Notice further that this is not an investigation of physics or hi.story
or criticism for answers to the philosophic question. Physicists are
not asked to decide about ethics, and dramatists are not queried about
God. One is interested in what is necessary to do physics or drama,
what it is necessary to assume by way of meanings and methods. This
is rather to probe them to show that the philosophic question emerges
from the heart of their own assumptions, that it both defines the nature
of the peculiar enterprise of each and provides a principle of selection
and relevance even for data.
Such transition courses would be liberal in the medieval sense of
grammar: an ability to interpret, to read or listen so carefully that
the ultimate assumptions are forthcoming. It would be philosophic
grammar in that its thrust is towards these ultimate, pervasive conceptions. Once they are isolated, once one is found irrvocably involved in a commitment to prerequisites, one can move from philosophic grammar to the history of philosophy or even to philosophic
inquiry itself, to courses whose explicit focus is the nature of motion,
the structure of art, the reality of institutions, the possibilities of
freedom. This "grammar" will make inquiry not only enriched beyond
possibility of a: single dogmatism, but relevant to the life and the
career of the student. It will show him that just as life or need has
led him to art or biology, so art and biology inevitably involve him
in philosophic commitments and questions. Most students are not
capable of sustained and serious work within philosophic inquiry as
such- at least on the undergraduate level. But they are capable of
philosophy-of seeing the need for wisdom in their lives and longing
for it, of loving it. Once this commitment to wisdom energizes and
unites the student, technical training in philosophy is not only subsequential, but imperative. History, semantics, logic, argumentation
and even defense can contribute as one moves from the love of wisdom
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to its possession. But without this initial love, the technical training
is without purpose or focus.
When I spoke of data offered by a liberal arts college as the
subject of a philosophic question, I detailed a number of fields in
which concepts and methods could be isolated: literature, physics,
history, etc. I did so, because, since the Renaissance, our conception
of liberal arts is that of various fields, various subject-matters, the
command over which supplies a new freedom to the students. But
there is an older conception of liberal education, one dating from the
Middle Ages and which conceives the liberal arts as disciplines, as
skills which can be brought to bear upon any subject-matter or any
field. Rhetoric, poetic grammar, and dialectic (sometimes) could be
brought to bear upon any discourse--either in literature or in scienceto discover the structure of its argument, to criticize the work as a
single unity, to understand the meaning of its terms and assertives
or to resolve the work to its presuppositions and interconvictions with
other such works. The fault of contemporary liberal arts is that the
emphasis upon subject-matter has so particularized each field as to
make communication difficult between them; the fault with those
of the Middle Ages was that the techniques for formal analysis became abstracted from subject-matter and fact.15 R. S. Crane and
Richard McKeon could contend, however, that there are those
universal disciplines, operative, even if unarticulated, within contemporary liberal arts, pervasively present in almost all undergradua te courses but studied as such by very few: Criticism, History ( from
history of philosophy and theology to natural histo1y and experimental
histories), Linguistics perhaps should rank among them.16 Philosophic
education within the liberal arts should function here as it functions
with the more obviously recognized fields: isolate their assumptions
and question them. Such a course at Chicago, for example, seriously
questions the meaning of rhetoric as it moves from a pseudo-art in
the Gorgias, to one of the universal arts in Aristotle, to the universal
method of all philosophy in the De Inuentione, to furnish the scientific
method for the Nouum Organum in Bacon. Philosophic grammar,
brought to bear upon rhetoric, would again reveal a pluralism of
15 Among the many studies of Rich ard P . McKean on this subject, cf. "The
Nature and Teaching of the Humanities," Journal of General Education 3
( 1949), pp. 290-303. "Action and the Use of the Humanities," Comprendre
No. 15 (Venice, 1956) pp. 69-83. "The Liberating Arts and the Humanizing
Arts in Education," in Humanistic Education and Western Civilization: Essays
for Robert M. Hutchins. Edited by Arthur A. Cohen. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart a nd Winston, 1964) pp. 158-1 81.
16 R. S. Crane, The Idea of the Human ities. (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1967) Vol. i, pp. 7-11. For the historica l elaboration of these
discussions at the University of Chicago, cf. Richard McKean, "Richard
McKean," American Spiritual Autobiographies. Edited by Louis Finkelstein.
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) pp. 90-92.
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possibilities and the subsequent matter for an innovation and an organization of sciences and arts for our time-a task of proper philosophic
mquuy.
The initial pages of this paper pointed out the three-fold ambiguity
within which philosophic instruction moved: the dichotomy between
teacher and wisdom, between philosophy and wisdom, and between
education and wisdom. The introduction of philosophic grammar as
the initiation of philosophic inquiry would go a long way to chart a
path through them:
1. For pace Wittgenstein, the teacher, does not pretend to a
competence in wisdom, but to a love and probing movement which
moves him continually to ask questions and to isolate the assumptions
which underlie a ll human knowledge.

2. Philosophy does not surrender its subject-matter, its methods
a nd its conclusions to the other knowledges of men, but indicates
that each of these knowledges presupposes those things which form
the subject-ma tter of philosophy.
3. And the educational proj ection of inability or distinterest among
the students falls against a program tha t moves through the student's
own interests and life-long commitments to those concepts, as yet
unexamined, by which these interests are evoked a nd by which these
commitments are justified.
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